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ABSTRACT 
Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper 
finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh1 
to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary 
attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  
It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity 
test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in 
parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian 
jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 
might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers 
might not have intended.  
This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification 
for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of 
the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights.  
The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely 
privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their 
basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the 
core roles of the House.    
In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then 
attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual 
citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” 
reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 Attorney-General v Leigh [2011] NZSC 106, [2012] 2 NZLR 713, (Leigh). 
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND GOW V LEIGH2 
LIFTING THE VEIL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 
AND  
PARLIAMENT’S RESPONSE  
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
While a member’s statement in Parliament is protected by absolute privilege for the purposes of 
the law of defamation,3 there is uncertainty as to whether absolute privilege should extend to 
things said outside the privileged proceedings themselves but which are necessarily connected to 
those proceedings. The law of parliamentary privilege prohibits judicial review of the merits of 
statements made in privileged proceedings,4 other than to refer to them to ascertain what has been 
stated for “historical” purposes.5 Imparting information to a member outside of the House’s 
privileged proceedings cannot absolutely protect an informant from a criminal or civil defamation 
suit. The informant is however entitled to a defence of qualified privilege, which can be rebutted 
if found to have been actuated by ill will or if the occasion had improperly been taken advantage 
of.6  
 In the case of Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh7 the Supreme Court of New Zealand held 
that it was not “necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the business of the House …”8  
for a defamatory statement communicated by a public officer to his or her Minister outside of the 
proceedings in parliament, to be classified as one of absolute privilege; suffice it for such 
statement to be protected by qualified privilege only—the privilege could be lost if the maker of 
the statement was actuated by ill will or he or she had taken advantage of the privileged occasion, 
to defame.  
  
2 Leigh above n1. 
3 Defamation Act 1992 s13. 
4 Bill of Rights 1688 art 9. 
5 Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd (TVNZ) [1994] 3 NZLR 1, [1995] 1 AC 321, [1994] 3 WLR 970 [1994] 3 All 
ER 407. 
6 Defamation Act 1992 s19. 
7 Leigh above n1 at 4.  
8 Leigh above n1 at 5. 
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A  Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh9 
The case under discussion was a defamation appeal in the Supreme Court from the decision of the 
Court of Appeal10 which held that the appellant Mr Gow was liable for defaming the respondent 
in an advice he had given to his Minister. The matter emerged when the Minister uttered the 
defamatory comments in the House of Representatives when answering a question asked of him 
during question time.11  
 The respondent, Leigh had been a contract advisor at the Ministry for Environment. She 
terminated her contract when another advisor was appointed by Government to review the project 
she had been working on. The then Minister for Environment was asked the parliamentary 
question for an oral answer about the circumstances surrounding Leigh’s abrupt departure from 
her post.12 To answer the question, the Minister sought advice from the Deputy CEO for 
Environment, Mr Gow who advised him both orally and in writing in a manner disapproving of 
Leigh which then the Minister used in the House to answer the parliamentary question.  
Apparently, parliamentary immunity would prevent Leigh from suing the Minister.13 She 
instead sued officer Gow for defamation for the advice he gave to the Minister.14 The appellant, 
Mr Gow however contended that his statement to the Minister occurred during “proceedings in 
Parliament” which was absolute privileged under art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688.15 The Supreme 
Court disagreed. Following the case of R v Chaytor16 and the Canadian case Canada (House 
Commons) v Vaid 17, the Court adopted “necessity” and found that the occasion in which the 
communication occurred was one of qualified privilege only.  In order to succeed in his claim for 
absolute privilege, which if successful would deprive citizens of their basic rights, Gow must 
show that his claim for absolute privilege was necessary as in the sense of “essential” to  the 
  
9 Leigh,above n 1. 
10Leigh v Attorney-General [2010] NZCA 624; [2011] 2 NZLR 148 (CA).  
11 Miss Leigh instigated a defamation suit against Mr Gow who was a public officer. Government was joint as party as 
Gow’s employer. The case commenced in the High Court and was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court of New 
Zealand. The High Court’s decision found no sufficient evidence to support the defamation claim which was later 
overturned by the Court of Appeal. The present case is the appeal on the Court of the Appeal’s decision. The 
Attorney General is representing the Government. Although the House of Representatives was not a party to the 
proceedings, it sent an intervener to address the Supreme Court on the aspects of parliamentary privilege.     
12 Leigh claimed the appointment of the reviewer, was politically motivated. When the case was heard in the Court of 
Appeal, evidence was adduced that “there was something of a political imbroglio developing in the course of which 
Leigh had been critical of the Government”.  
13 Defamation Act 1992 s 13. 
14Privileges Committee Report on Question of privilege concerning the defamation action Attorney-General and Gow v 
Leigh (June 2013). 
15 Bill of Rights 1688, art 9. 
16R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52, [2011] 1 AC 684, [2011] 1 All ER 805. 
17 Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid 2005 SCC 30, [2005] 1 SCR 667 at [4]. 
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proper functioning of the House. It concluded that the defamatory statement was not necessary for 
the core function of the House to be classified as one of absolute privilege. Suffice it for the 
statement to be an occasion of qualified privilege, which could be lost if rebutted on the ground 
that Gow had been actuated by ill will or had taken improper advantage of the privileged occasion 
of his communication with the Minister, to defame Leigh.18 
Parliament apparently was unhappy with the Supreme Court’s decision.19  Convinced that 
the Court was impinging on its privilege and causing a “chilling effect” its right to acquire 
information for the effective conduct of its business, 20 Parliament recommended a Bill to protect 
its privileges by defining the scope of “proceedings in parliament”, and to abolish the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Leigh.21 On 30 July, 2014 Parliament passed the Parliamentary Privilege Act 
2014.   
It is submitted that Parliament overreacted to the decision in Leigh. 22 One of the reasons it 
claimed was the Court wrongly applied the cases of Chaytor23 and Canada (House Commons) v 
Vaid,24 both of which they claimed involved the boundaries of parliament’s exclusive cognizance 
whereas the issue in Leigh was one of parliament’s freedom of speech, which fell to be 
determined by statutory interpretation of art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688.  This assertion is 
doubted as will be seen, art 9 freedom of speech is not a stand-alone phenomenon but falls to be 
regulated by parliamentary exclusive cognizance.    
The decision in Leigh gave Parliament the opportunity to balance the two competing values 
of the protection of the individual’s reputation while “ensuring that the member … at the time he 
speaks is not inhibited from stating fully and freely what he has to say” (emphasis in the 
original).25 Rather than opting to legislate to protect its privilege and immunities, a move that is 
viewed by many as involving an “unavoidable certain element of self-interest…”,26 Parliament  
should have appropriately examined the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in light of the 
implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of 
  
18 Defamation Act 1992, s 19. 
19Vernon Small “MPs clamouring to put Supreme Court in its place” (29 November 2012) <http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-
press/opinion/8011935/MPs-clamouring-to-put-Supreme-Court-in-its-place>; Privileges Committee above n14; 
Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed. Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2014) at 
421. 
20 Privileges Committee above n 14.  
21 Privileges Committee above n14. 
22 Privileges Committee above n14. 
23 Chaytor above n16. 
24 Vaid above n17. 
25 Prebble above n5 at 8.  
26Andrew Geddis “On Privilege, Absolute and Qualified” (1 December 2012) <www.pundit.co.nz/content/on-privilege-
absolute-or-qualified>.  
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parliamentary privilege and taken into consideration the human rights obligations New Zealand 
has under the BORA and its international human rights commitments.   
Part II of this essay introduces the sources of parliamentary privilege in New Zealand 
followed by an analysis of the key cases in Part III.  Part IV discusses the Parliamentary Privilege 
Act 2014 and the implication of the interpretation of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of 
parliamentary privilege. Part V of this essay discusses a number of reforms that are apt to be 
considered for striking a balance between the two competing values of protecting the reputation 
of individuals and parliamentary freedom of speech and for the maintenance of comity.  
B Definition 
Parliamentary privilege is a term that is used “to refer to immunities and special rights, which are 
deemed essential for empowering legislatures to protect themselves and their members from 
outside interference”27 so they can effectively carry out their core functions of “making laws … 
providing a government … scrutinizing and controlling Government … and representing 
Government and the people”.28   
The traditional definition of parliamentary privilege is found in Erskine May:29 
Parliamentary privilege is the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House 
collectively… and by Members of each House individually, without which they could 
not discharge their functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies or 
individuals. Thus privilege, though part of the law of the land, is to a certain extent an 
exemption from the general law.    
Parliamentary privilege in New Zealand has English origins rooted in the Westminster 
system of government;  a constitutional arrangement adopted by New Zealand as a legacy of its 
colonial past.30  Similar to that enjoyed in the English parliament, parliamentary privilege in New 
Zealand comprises a series of freedoms, immunities and powers which allow members of the 
House of Representatives to independently conduct their core functions without the obligation to 
have to account other than to effectively operate in the overarching interest of the public.31  
  
27 Privileges Committee above n14.  
28 David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (3rd ed, Dunmore Publishing, Wellington, 2005) at 2-4. 
29 William McKay Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, and Usages of Parliament (23rd ed, LexisNexis 
London, 2004) at 12.  
30 Kelly Buchanan “The Impact of Foreign law on Domestic Judgments” The Library of Congress. 
<www.loc.gov/law/hel/domestic-judgment/newzealand.php>.  
31 McGee above n28 at 605. 
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Parliamentary privilege is an often misunderstood concept.32 To a great number of people, 
the word “privilege” implies that there are special protections for parliamentarians, even to the 
extent that they are above the law.33 Historically, claims of misuse of parliamentary privilege 
against members of public are by no means unknown,34 for instance in 1728 for “digging of Lord 
Gage’s coal”, in 1739 for “killing Lord Galway’s rabbits” and in 1742 for “assaulting Sir Watkin 
William Wynn’s porter in Downing Street”.35 More recent cases of the “cash for questions” in 
Hamilton v Al Fayed 36 and the expenses scandal in Chaytor37 have  only succeeded in confusing 
public perceptions about the proper purpose of parliamentary privilege.  
II CONCEPTIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 
A    Bill of Rights 1688  
The doctrine of parliamentary privilege in the United Kingdom emerged out of a history of 
conflicts between the monarch and parliament which culminated in the Glorious Revolution of 
168838. Historically, parliament’s most prominent and oldest privilege, the freedom of speech was 
introduced to prevent the Monarch from interfering with the functioning of parliament.39 The 
famous statement in art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 declares: 40  
That freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.  
McGee41 observes art 9 is the source from which flows a number of “immunities which 
apply to the House, its members, and other participants in parliamentary proceedings”.42 The 
basic concept underlying art 9 is the protection of members and participants in parliamentary 
proceedings; that at the time that they speak, they should do so freely without fear that their 
words might subsequently be reviewed by the courts.43 Article 9, therefore, is the legislative 
provision that falls to be interpreted by the courts when determining both whether a privilege 
  
32 New Zealand House of Representatives “Parliament Brief : Parliamentary Privilege” (February 2007) 
<www.parliament.nz> 
33 Office of the Leader of the House of Commons “Parliamentary Privilege” (April 2012) <www.official-
documents.gov.uk> and <www.commonsleader.gov.uk>. 
34 Public Issues Committee Parliamentary Privilege (Auckland District Law Society, 27 September 1979). 
35 Public Issues above n34. These incidents were documented by Curwood, Counsel for Stockdale in the leading case of 
Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 9A E 1, 112 ER 1112 (QB). 
36 Hamilton v Al Fayed [2001] 1 AC 395. 
37 Chaytor above n16. 
38 Bill of Rights 1688, preamble. 
39 Bill of Rights 1688, preamble. 
40 Bill of Rights, 1688 art 9. 
41McGee, above n 28.    
42 McGee, above n 28 at 618. 
43 Prebble above n 5.    
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exists and the scope of those ones that are known to exist.44  For the purpose of the defamation 
law, art 9 is the foundation of the defence of “absolute privilege”45 which affords complete 
immunity to words spoken during proceedings in parliament.  
McGee’s position is to be distinguished from what Adam Tucker identified as an “unitary 
conception of parliamentary privilege”46 where, in order to identify the privilege, one needs only 
ask “Does the matter for which the appellants are being prosecuted…fall within the exclusive 
cognizance of Parliament?” If it does, then there is no further requirement to have such matter 
separately determined under the Bill of Rights. Tucker holds that art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 
“is not the source or foundation of parliamentary privilege…but a legislative exception to that 
doctrine”.47 The Bill of Rights, then, “should not be treated as more important that it is”.48  He is 
convinced that the foundation of parliamentary privilege is in parliament’s right to self-regulate or 
its “exclusive cognizance”.  Tucker’s proposition is supported by the fact that the Bill of Rights 
1688 is merely declaratory of the privilege rather than itself being a source of the privilege.49 
 It is therefore submitted that the Court in Leigh was not obliged to adopt the standard 
techniques of statutory interpretation in considering the scope of the freedom of speech privilege 
because the privilege is set out in article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688.   It is submitted that the 
Court was at liberty to use any of the common law tests that it found most appropriately applied 
to determining the scope of parliamentary privilege in the case before it.        
 On the Bill of Rights 1688, constitutional experts agree that art 9 has two aspects that guide 
the relation between the judiciary and the legislature in a democracy and parliament’s scope of 
privilege. These are the “freedom of speech” and “comity”. 
1 Parliament’s Freedom of Speech 
The most prominent parliamentary privilege declared in art 9 is the privilege of “freedom of 
speech”.50  Lord Denman CJ in Stockdale v Hansard stated:51  
  
44 Enid Campbell, Parliamentary Privilege (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2003). 
45 Public Issues above n 34. 
46 Adam Tucker Response to Government consultation on the Green Paper, Cm 8318, paragraph 17. Tucker's response 
to the Green Paper was taken into account in the UK Report of the Joint Committee for Parliamentary Privilege, 2013 
at 8, 43, 66. 
47 Tucker, above n46.  
48 Tucker, above n46. 
49 Prebble above n 5.  
50 McGee above n 28  at 618; Prebble above n 5. 
51 Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 9 A & E 1, 112 ER 1112 (QB). 
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For speeches in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other 
person, or hazardous to the public peace, that member enjoys complete 
immunity. 
Freedom of speech is an “uninhibited speech that is the quintessential requirement of open 
debate”.52 Joseph53states “that Parliament’s freedom of speech privilege has uncontested 
application under art 9 of the Bill of Rights”54 under which elected members in the performance 
of their high office are enabled to function freely and fully without interference.55  
The Privy Council in Prebble v Television New Zealand56 was explicit that the privilege in 
art 9 is vested in a member or a witness of a committee “at the time that he speaks”:57  
The underlying concept of article 9 is a privilege…to ensure that the member or 
witness at the time he speaks is not inhibited from stating fully and freely what 
he has to say [emphasis in original]. 
The Privy Council in Prebble noted the conflict between the interests of an individual to be 
able to access remedy in the courts for harmed reputation, and the interest of the public to be able 
to freely address their concerns through their elected members in parliament, required that the 
latter interest should prevail over the former even to the detriment of individuals or to the extent 
that parliamentarians are perceived to be above the law.58 
In this case Prebble, who was a member of Parliament, sued Television New Zealand for 
defamation. In its defence, the Television sought to produce what had been said by Prebble 
during the proceedings of parliament as evidence in its defence.  Prebble sought a stay of 
proceedings on the ground that the material sought was privileged.  For the Court to use his 
statement in the House to determine its merits would constitute a breach of art 9.59   
What must be noted is that the freedom of speech is not the same as a licence to harm with 
impunity the reputations of persons who are unable to answer for themselves, nor does it mean 
that members should disregard how their acts or words might be viewed outside of parliament.60 
Additionally, it is wrong to assume that conduct that is protected by parliamentary privilege is 
  
52 Prebble above n 5.     
53 Philip A. Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2014)  
54 Joseph above n 53  at 427. 
55 House of Lords House of Commons “Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Report of Session 2013–14” (3 
July 2013). <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtprivi/30/30.pdf> 
56Prebble above n 5.  
57 Prebble above n 5 at 8. 
58 Office of the Leader of the House of Commons above n 33. 
59 Prebble above n 5. 
60 Geddis above n 26. 
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protected absolutely, or that freedom of speech is absolutely free.61  In fact, the conduct of 
members during proceedings in parliament is regulated by parliament’s Standing Orders, 
Speaker’s rulings and other internal mechanisms. Freedom of speech can also be abrogated by 
legislation62. For example, the Crimes Act 1961 could abrogate a claim of immunity in relation to 
charges of corruption, bribery or perjury by members of parliament.63  
2  Comity   
On the other side of the art 9 coin is the concept of comity.  Comity is the “mutual restraint” that 
regulates the relationship between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive which enables 
each institution to conduct its individual role in maintaining the balance of power in a democracy. 
Central to comity is the concept of separation of power64—the democratic principle that 
“distributes the power to govern between the three arms of government which each works within 
defined areas of responsibility so that each keeps check on the action of others”.65  
The principle of comity that governs the relationship between the judiciary and the 
legislature requires that debates and proceedings in parliament must not be “questioned in any 
court or place out of parliament”66.  Parliament on the other hand is obliged by the sub judice rule 
not to question any matter that is before the court.67 To ensure that proceedings before the court or 
its decisions are not prejudiced by parliamentary proceedings, the Speaker has the discretion to 
rule on sub judice matters. The sub judice rule, however, cannot prevent the House from 
legislating on any matter, whether or not the matter is before the courts.68  
The principle of comity, however, has evolved over the years with some aspects of the 
proceedings in parliament becoming justiciable in the courts. In the landmark case of Pepper v 
Hart69, the House of Lords established the principle that the legislative history of a piece of 
legislation could be used to aid judicial interpretation. Prior to this case, such a ruling would have 
been seen as a breach of privilege. Perhaps the case that caused the most concern for comity was 
the Australian case of R v Murphy70 in which the court interpreted art 9 to mean that the statement 
  
61 Tucker above n 46.   
62 McGee above n 28 at 618; Crimes Act s102, 103 and 109; Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 s9. 
63 Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014, s9.  
64 Charles de Secondat Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989) as cited in 
Jan-Erik Lane Constitutions and Political Theory (Manchester University Press, United Kingdom, 1996) at 39.  
65 Above n 64. 
66 Bill of Rights, 1688 art 9. 
67 McGee above n 28 at 192-194. 
68 McGee above n 28 at 193. 
69 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593. 
70 R v Murphy (1986) 5 NSWLR 18. 
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of a witness in a parliamentary committee could be examined to prove the truth or merit of their 
testimony in court.  
The concern about the Murphy71 case was the court held that art 9 only applied to cases in 
which the court was being asked to expose the maker of the statement to legal liability. That is, 
what had been said in parliament was subject to judicial review as long as it did not expose the 
maker of the statement to legal liability. The ruling in Murphy was contrary to the rationale of art 
9, that members should be assured, as far as possible, of the freedom to speak during proceedings 
in parliament so that, while speaking, they should not fear that their words would be held against 
them in the courts.   Prebble72 held that Murphy73 created a “chilling effect” which would prevent 
members and witnesses in parliamentary committees “from stating fully and freely” what they 
had to say for fear that such statement might subsequently be questioned in court.  As a result the 
Australian Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth)74 to 
overturn the decision in Murphy.75 
There is no objection to the use of Hansard76 to “prove what was done and said in the 
Parliament as a matter of history… provided …the proof of the historical fact is not used to 
suggest that the words were improperly spoken or statute passed to achieve an improper 
purpose”.77  The United Kingdom courts, however have adopted a flexible approach in regard to 
the use of privileged material in the judicial review of Government decisions. In R v Brind78, the 
court judicially examined a minister’s statement in Parliament to establish whether the minister’s 
power had been properly exercised. In Toussaint v Attorney-General of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines79, the United Kingdom Privy Council even held that a minister’s statement in 
Parliament was judicially reviewable to establish the motive for an executive action outside of 
parliament.   
In light of these developments, the United Kingdom 1999 Joint Privileges Committee80 
recommended allowing privileged material in judicial review actions of government decisions.81 
  
71 Murphy above n 70.        
72 Prebble above n 5.    
73 Murphy above n 70.    
74 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth). 
75 Murphy above n 70. 
76 Standing Order 408(2). 
77 Prebble above n 5; Standing Order 408 (2). 
78 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind (1991) UKHL 4; [1991] AC 696. 
79 Toussaint v Attorney-General of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines [2007] UKPC 48. 
80 House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Report of Session 1998-99, at [55]. 
81 Joint Report 1998-1999 above n 80. 
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However, recent 2014 Joint Privileges Committee82 report recommended a “middle way” 
approach in which the courts would be left “to develop their interpretation of Article 9, in respect 
of admissibility of parliamentary proceedings, while requiring them to notify Parliament 
whenever it is proposed to refer to such proceedings in evidence”.83  
This approach by United Kingdom to comity has been criticised as: 84 
[A]n unprincipled exception to art 9…The courts in New Zealand have judicially 
noted but not adopted the English practice. Article 9 has never taken notice of 
the subject-matter of ministers’ statements in Parliament – be they defamatory 
statements …. [If English practices] were ever to take root in New Zealand, the 
ministers would have cause to fear the ‘judge over the shoulder’.  
More recently in New Zealand, tension in comity arose from the Buchanan v Jennings85 
case in which the Privy Council held that absolute privilege did not extend to repetitions outside 
of Parliament of protected statements made earlier in the House, irrespective of the fact that the 
repetition was not exactly the words earlier spoken in the House and were not in themselves 
defamatory (“effective repetition”). Parliament regarded the court’s ruling in Buchanan as a 
judicial questioning of its privilege and recommended an enactment to overturn the Privy 
Council’s decision.86   
(a) Judicial Notice   
Comity imposes a duty on the judiciary to take judicial notice of parliamentary immunities 
and privileges. Section 242(2) of the Legislature Act 1908 provides 87 that parliament immunities 
and privileges are expected to be judicially taken notice of and it “shall not be necessary to plead 
the same, and the same shall be judicially taken notice of in all Courts and by and before all 
judges”.88    
The Supreme Court is being criticised for failing to observe comity by not taking judicial 
notice of the practicalities of parliamentary procedures when it determined Leigh.  Parliament89 
protested that the Leigh decision was the result of the Court failing “to recognize the practical 
  
82 Joint Committee 2014 above n 55 at 133. 
83 Joint Committee 2014 above n 55 at 133. 
84 Joseph above n 53 at 460 and 461. 
85 Buchanan v Jennings [2004] UKPC 36; [2005] 1 AC 115. 
86 Mary Harris, Clerk of the House of Representatives of New Zealand “Submission to the Parliamentary Privilege 
Consultation for UK Joint Committee on Privilege 2012” at 3. 
87 Legislature Act 1908, s242 (2) now repealed and replaced by new provisions in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 
2014. 
88 Legislature Act above n 87, s242 (2).      
89 Privileges Committee Report on Leigh above n 14. 
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operations of the House and its committees”.90  Section 24 of the Supreme Court Act 2003 
provides that “Appeals to the Supreme Court proceed by rehearing”.91 Effectively the Supreme 
Court had the power to hear the full evidence of the Leigh case and act as judges of both the fact 
and law.  
The doctrine of judicial notice requires the Court to take judicial notice only of a fact which 
is “so notorious that it cannot be the subject of serious dispute”.92 In this context, parliamentary 
practice can be classified as a “legislative fact” which is one of four classes of facts that a court is 
expected to take notice of.93 A legislative fact informs judges when they formulate, interpret or 
develop the law”.94   
(b) Testing of Facts  
Ultimately though, taking judicial notice facilitates the discharge of the applicable burden 
of proof i.e. on the balance of probabilities on the basis of the evidence before the court.95 
According to the Privileges Committee, the fact in issue the Court should have taken judicial 
notice of was, the adverse statement conveyed by the public officer to the Minister was made 
during a “proceeding in parliament” of question time which was an occasion of absolute 
privilege, and therefore protected by parliamentary immunity. However when the Court evaluated 
the evidence against the law,96 the evidence on a balance of probabilities did not justify elevating 
the qualified privilege of the occasion of the officer communicating with his Minister, to that of 
absolute privilege. 97      
Collisions between the legislature and the judiciary can sometimes impair their power to 
impart those constitutional rights for which individuals look to them to protect on their behalf.98 
However, comity is not static. The UK Joint Report acknowledges that the “…general principle 
of comity, which nobody would challenge, does not prevent constant evolution and occasional 
tension”.99  The development from a direct challenge to the House of Commons in Stockdale v 
  
90 Privileges Committee above n14.. 
91 Supreme Court Act 2003, s 24.  
92 Law Commission Evidence Law: Documentary Evidence and Judicial Notice (NZLC PP22, 1994) at 96. 
93 Above n92 at 96. 
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95 Above n87, at 102. 
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Hansard100 to an “almost exaggeratedly respect for parliamentary cognizance in Bradlaugh v 
Gosset”101 is an illustration of the changing trend in the relationship between the institutions of 
the judiciary and the legislature. This is in contrast to the proposition that comity is a settled area, 
with which the Court in Leigh was accused of having failed to observe by introducing an untested 
technique into “areas that were once thought settled”.102       
B Exclusive Cognizance 
Exclusive cognizance is parliament’s freedom or sovereignty to regulate its own proceedings 
without having to account to anyone. The case of Bradlaugh v Gosset103 recognised the 
supremacy of parliament’s exclusive cognizance. There, the court held that the resolution of the 
House of Commons not to allow an elected member to enter the House was subject to the House’s 
sole jurisdiction although the member was under a statutory obligation to enter the House in order 
to take his oath.104 Additionally, the Privy Council in Prebble ruled that the right vested in 
parliament for the protection of public interests was overriding.   
Contrary to the popular view that art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 is the foundation of 
parliamentary privilege105, there exists a proposition that parliament’s “exclusive cognizance—the 
right for parliament to self-regulate is the foundation of parliamentary privilege.106 Hence, the 
privilege only exists to protect parliament’s right to self-regulate.107 Yet, parliament in its 
exclusive cognizance can overrule or elevate this protection even to the point that 
parliamentarians could be seen to be above the law.108 
3 Waiver  
Parliament109 is of the view that privilege cannot be waived without legislation.110 However, 
concern is raised about the ability of the House to waive its privilege as this would allow the 
“majority to use their voting power to affect the rights of individual members of parliament who 
are not members of that majority.”111 The Privy Council in Prebble opposed any right for a 
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member to waive privilege to allow judicial review of privileged material, even to the benefit of a 
member in a legal action that has been initiated by the member.112 Initiating a legal action does 
not mean that the member implicitly waives the protection of privilege.113 The Court in Chaytor, 
though, was more certain that art 9 was incapable of waiver even by parliamentary resolution114 
unless by legislation.  
C Competing Conceptions of Parliamentary Privilege 
There are claims that the decision in Leigh was flawed in that the Supreme Court wrongly applied 
Chaytor115 because that case involved the question of exclusive cognizance while the issue in 
Leigh was that of parliamentary freedom of speech.116  Central to these claims, is the 
misconceived idead that freedom of speech operates separately from exclusive cognizance.117 
However, it is submitted that there is no free-standing freedom of speech; that “conduct which is 
protected by parliamentary privilege is not protected absolutely”.118 Rather, freedom of speech 
and parliamentary privilege are subject to the House’s internal rules and procedures.119 Freedom 
of speech can also be disallowed or abrogated by the criminal laws.120  
Lord Roger’s ruling in Chaytor supports this view.121 In this case, two members of the 
House of Commons were charged with fraud for submitting false expense claims albeit such 
claims were set into process by a parliament resolution.122 The members claimed that by either art 
9 or exclusive cognizance they were immune from arrest.  Lord Rogers concluded that the sole 
question that needed to be asked was whether the members’ conducts fell within exclusive 
cognizance.  To tackle the issue by “reading the conduct into article 9”123 as distinct from 
exclusive cognizance would be the wrong “choice of conception” as this would suggest that art 9 
was the source of the parliamentary privilege whose protection the two members were seeking.  
  
112 Prebble above n5. 
113 Prebble above n 5. 
114 Chaytor above n 16. 
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120 Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 s9; see McGee above 28 at 619. 
121 Chaytor above n16.  
122 The Court found that although the scheme was established by parliamentary resolution which attracted 
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attract privilege. 
123 Tucker above n 53at [7]. 
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Instead, the correct conception was; the foundation of parliamentary privilege is parliament’s 
right to self-regulate.124 The members’ appeal in Chaytor consequently failed because their 
conducts were of a criminal nature which parliament’s exclusive cognizance did not regulate. 
The concept of exclusive cognizance is at odds with the principle of the rule of law; that is, 
that the law be general and that no one should be above the law.125 Consequently, the powers, 
immunities and rights – collectively called “parliamentary privilege” – that fall to be regulated by 
parliamentary exclusive cognizance alone excludes the courts from reviewing those privileges.126 
Hence, parliament internal procedures are not reviewable by the courts unless parliament 
legislates to allow it.    
D Proceedings in Parliament 
The ambiguity arising from what constitutes “proceedings in parliament” in art 9 of the 1688 Bill 
of Rights is often cause for contention between the courts and parliament.127 The phrase 
commonly falls to be interpreted by the courts when determining the scope of parliamentary 
privilege.128 The phrase “proceedings in parliament” is now defined in the 2014 Act.129 It is 
verbatim of the definition of the phrase in the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia.130 
Words spoken in “proceedings in parliament” on the floor of the House and its committees 
fall to be regulated by parliamentary exclusive cognizance. 131  Whether absolute privilege applies 
to words that have their origin outside of the absolutely privileged sphere of parliament and its 
committees sometimes has not been so clear cut132.  The grey area in Leigh133 was whether the 
defamatory information conferred by a public officer to his Minister at the latter’s request to 
enable the Minister to answer a parliamentary question, which he repeated on the floor of the 
House, was part of the proceedings in Parliament and therefore protected from scrutiny by the 
court.    
  
124 Tucker above n 46 [9]. 
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The Leigh decision concluded that proceedings in parliament were limited by necessity.134 
This demanded that Parliament’s “claim to exclusive cognizance should be strictly limited to 
those areas where immunity from normal legal oversight is necessary in order to safeguard the 
effective functioning of Parliament”.135 The corollary to Leigh’s “necessity” limitation on 
privilege is the notion that the rights of harmed citizens to have access to remedy should include 
some degree of leverage against an adverse statement that not only originated outside of 
parliament but was not necessary to the core functioning of the House.   
Determining the scope of “proceedings in parliament” (the sphere within which absolute 
privilege exists) is within the jurisdiction of the courts.136 Parliament and the courts’ 
understanding of the scope of “proceedings in parliament” has largely been mutual and governed 
by comity. For instance, Parliament’s decision to update its rules to take account of “natural 
justice”137 procedures to allow a right of response for citizens who are targets of adverse 
comments in the House or its committees, arose from the decision in Prebble138.  
However, tension would often arise, as has occurred in the Leigh decision. The situation in 
Leigh is perhaps best expressed in the Clerk’s words:139 
We have got to the point that the Australians perhaps got to in the 1980s with the 
Murphy case, where the courts had taken a direction that was starting to impinge 
potentially on the way the House might operate and, therefore at the very least 
proceedings in Parliament need to be defined.  
 
III   SOURCES OF PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
The source of parliamentary privilege in New Zealand is a mixture of legislation, 
common law and the practices of Parliament.140The country’s Westminster type of 
Government derives from the United Kingdom as a legacy of its colonial past. Initially, the New 
Zealand colonial legislature did not possess all the powers of the Houses of Parliament of Great 
Britain. The Keilly v Carson141established that all colonial legislatures enjoyed only those 
  
134 UK Joint Report 2014 above n 55 at [8]. 
135 UK Joint Report 2014 above n 55 at [10]. 
136 Stockdale above n 51.   
137 Standing Orders 233-235  
138 Prebble above n5. 
139 Mary Harris, above n 86.     
140 May above n 29. 
141 Keilly v Carson (1842) 4 Moo PC 63, 13 ER 225 (PC) [88-90]. 
19 
 
privileges of the British House of Commons that were necessary for the efficient functioning of 
those legislatures, which did not include the power to punish for contempt.142 
A   Legislative source 
Under the Privileges Act 1865143, the New Zealand General Assembly “arrogated to itself all the 
powers and privilege of the House of Commons as at 1st January, 1865”144. This was later 
incorporated into the Legislature Act 1908 s242 (1) which provided:145  
The Legislative Council and House of Representatives respectively, and the 
Committees and members thereof respectively, shall hold, enjoy, and exercise such 
and the like privileges, immunities, and powers as on the first day of January, on 
thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, were held, enjoyed, and exercised by the 
Commons House of Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the Committees 
and members thereof, so far as the same are not inconsistent with or repugnant to such 
of the provisions of the Constitution Act as on the twenty-sixth of September, one 
thousand eight hundred and sixty five. 
The Legislature Act 1908 has recently been replaced by the Parliamentary Privilege Act 
2014.146 However, section 8(1) of the new Act147 expressly provides for the continuance of the 
privilege “exercisable by the House of Commons...its committees, or its members” as it was on 1 
January 1865 subject to the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 on the date of the coming into 
operation of that Act on 26 September 1865.148  
B   Common Law Source  
 The case of Keilly v Carson149 established that colonial parliaments did not inherit certain 
privileges that were only inherent in the High Court of Parliament of the British House of 
Commons.150  
Keilly was an appeal from the British colony of Newfoundland against punishment for 
contempt of Parliament exacted on the appellant Keilly. The Privy Council held that colonial 
legislatures did not have the power to punish for contempt. Such power was only inherent in the 
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British House of Commons “on the ground that that House was part of a court of law, the High 
Court of Parliament”151.  A colonial legislature however only possessed “the right of protecting 
itself from all the impediments to the due course of its proceedings.”152 To be able to secure the 
exercise of their legislative functions, colonial legislatures “are justified in acting by the principle 
of the common law.”153 In other words, colonial legislatures were allowed to apply common law 
as was necessary to protect its procedures but they could not punish for contempt of parliament. 
That power was exclusive only to the House of Lords because of its judicial legacy of once being 
a High Court of Parliament.   
Essentially, the “necessity” test in Keilly was whether any of the powers, immunities and 
privileges of the House of Commons could be adapted as necessary for the effective functioning 
of colonial legislatures.154  McGee warns that the Keilly “necessity” is not the legal foundation of 
parliamentary privilege in New Zealand although necessity can help determine its scope:155 
While necessity can help to elucidate the existence and extent of a particular 
privilege…it is not the legal foundation of parliamentary privilege in New 
Zealand. That foundation has, since 1865, been firmly rooted in New Zealand’s 
own statute law.  
The Supreme Court, is claimed to have failed to apply the Keilly necessity to ensure that 
privilege is adapted as necessary for the effective functioning of Parliament. Contrary to the 
Keilly necessity, Supreme Court used a novel and misguided156 necessity test which instead 
sought to “affix the scope of parliamentary privilege”157 as to whether or not parliament could 
operate without it.      
C  Practice of Parliament  
In the House of Representatives and its committees, speeches – including slander that would 
otherwise be unlawful or criminal outside of these occasions of absolute privilege, but excluding 
criminal acts “taken in the face of parliament and its committees” 158  – are protected by 
parliamentary privilege.  
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1 Speeches on floor of the House 
The floor of the House is exclusively the domain of members of Parliament. Slander or 
defamatory language made in such a way as to readily identify a person is not listed in the 
contempt list in the Standing Orders.159 To make it a contempt would inhibit the member’s 
constitutional right to freely speak in debates without fear that their words might subsequently be 
reviewed by the courts. Speeches in debates are subject solely to the Speaker’s control. In most 
cases, one cannot expect any remedy other than an apology which the Speaker would demand of 
the maker.  The maker of the comment would only be subject to contempt when he or she fails to 
obey the Speaker’s order for eg, to retract such comments, but such incidents are rare.160    
Adverse comments on the floor of the House can cause irreparable harm and can go unchecked 
unless the person has a “hero” in the House to speak in his or her defence.161  
2  Statements in Select Committees  
Statements in Select Committees are much more subject to control. Members of the public 
can attend the committees. Standing Orders 233 to 235162 relate to written documents submitted 
in committee meetings.  “Natural justice” procedures are in place to provide any person including 
members, “against whom an allegation has been made that may seriously damage the reputation 
of that person”163 with a right to respond to anything said or act done by a member or a witness to 
a committee that might damage the person’s reputation.164  Complaints against apparent bias, or 
in regard to any evidence produced that could pose a risk of serious damage to someone’s 
reputation, are also provided for. One of the remedies available is for responses to be incorporated 
in the committee records. A committee chairman may order the alleged offending evidence to be 
returned, resubmitted or expunged from parliamentary records.165   
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IV DISCUSSION OF CASES  
A R v Chaytor166 
The case of Chaytor is one of the landmark authorities for the necessity test used in Leigh. The 
case of R v Chaytor167 concerned whether or not an occasion fell to be regulated solely within the 
House’s exclusive cognizance ie, the House’s right to self-regulate.  In this case, two members of 
the House of Commons were charged under the Theft Act168 for submitting dishonest claims for 
allowances made whilst they were ministers.  The defendants contended that either “under art 9 or 
under the exclusive cognizance they had absolute privilege and could not be prosecuted in the 
ordinary courts”.169  Lord Phillips puts the test as follows: 170 
It supports the proposition however, that the principal matter to which article 9 is 
directed is freedom of speech and debate in the Houses of Parliament and in 
parliamentary committees.  This is where the core or essential business of 
Parliament takes place.  In considering whether actions outside the Houses and 
committees fall within parliamentary proceedings because of their connection to 
them, it is necessary to consider the nature of that connection and whether, if 
such actions do not enjoy privilege, this is likely to impact adversely on the core 
or essential business of Parliament. [emphasis added].  
 The Court rejected the defendants’ appeals by finding it was not essential to the core 
function of the House that their acts be clothed with absolute privilege.  
In regard art 9, Chaytor concluded that that article was primarily directed to freedom of 
speech and debate in the Houses of Parliament and its committees. Effectively, art 9 protection 
though would only “apply to parliamentary proceedings which were recognisable as part of the 
formal collegiate activities of Parliament”.171 The incidents at issue were of criminal nature. Even 
though these occurred within parliament’s own precincts and the process was approved by the 
House’s resolution, they were not necessary to forming the formal collegiate activities of the 
House.172  
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The Court in Chaytor found that the decisions taken by Parliament relating to 
administrative matters were immune from challenge in the courts but the implementation of the 
decisions to make the payments the subject to the charges, were not so protected.    
Parliament did not assert its exclusive cognizance to deal with the fraudulent conduct even 
where the conduct interfered with the proceedings of the House or its committees.173 Further, the 
House invited the police to investigate the matter in its precincts.174   
The ruling in Chaytor affirms the aspect of the rule of law for the courts in the United 
Kingdom that exclusive cognizance does not extend to the operation of criminal law. 
B Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid175 
The second case authority for the necessity test in Leigh is the Vaid case. A former employee of 
Parliament filed an action against the Speaker for constructive dismissal on the ground of 
discrimination, contrary to the Canadian Human Rights Act176. The Canadian parliament pleaded 
parliamentary privilege, under which exclusive cognizance would prevent the court from 
questioning the Speaker about the employment decisions that he made.  The court, applied the test 
of necessity to assess whether or not Parliament’s exclusive cognizance applied.177    
Binnie J encapsulated the same principle in Chaytor, but he elevated the test to a “doctrine 
of necessity”; that is, “whether it is necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the business 
of the House for an occasion in question to be classified as one of absolute privilege”.178 The 
court found that Parliament’s exclusive cognizance was limited to matters closely and directly 
connected with its core functions as a legislative and deliberative body, and did not extend to 
matters such as the employment rights enjoyed by ancillary staff.179   
C  Discussion of Leigh180 
1 Connectivity with “proceedings in Parliament” 
In order to qualify Gow’s adverse statement for absolute privilege, there had to be 
connection between the occasion in which it occurred with the proceedings in Parliament. 
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Gow contended that the degree of closeness or incidentality of the making of the 
statement to the Minister was such that it was implicit in the Minister’s obligation to 
answer the parliamentary question, thus making it part of the proceedings in parliament 
for the purposes of art 9.  Gow’s argument was worded on the test of “reasonable 
incidentality” based on s 16(2) of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth).  The 
Supreme Court dismissed this argument holding that the statement made by a public 
officer “to a Minister for the purposes of replying to questions for oral answer were not 
themselves parliamentary proceedings”181 but that of qualified privilege. The test of 
necessity did not find it necessary for the core function of the House for the statement to 
be classified as one of absolute privilege.    
 To determine whether the statement was sufficiently connected to the business of 
the House to be classified as part of parliament proceedings, the Court adopted the 
“necessity test” from Chaytor and Vaid which asked whether it was essential for an act or 
word that originated outside of where the core function of parliament takes place, to be 
protected by absolute privilege without which the core functions of the House would be 
impaired.  The onus is on the party claiming the protection to prove that it was essential 
or necessary for the statement or the occasion to be given more protection than qualified 
privilege without which the House would adversely be deprived of its ability to conduct 
its core function.  The Supreme Court found that it was not necessary or essential for the 
proper functioning of the House for the adverse statement to be classified as an occasion 
other than qualified privilege:182  
Where the claim for absolute privilege would result, if successful in depriving 
citizens of their common law rights, the courts will be astute to ensure that the 
claimed absolute privilege is truly necessary for the proper and effective 
functioning of Parliament… .Necessity has a sharper focus and involves 
significantly less uncertainty than closeness of connection.  Furthermore, any test 
involving less than necessity would impinge too much on common law rights.  
Necessity is the appropriate test. 
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 The Court was also unpersuaded by McGee’s proposition that parliamentary 
privilege in New Zealand was based on statute and that “necessity” played only a 
subordinate role in determining its scope. It believed that McGee presupposed that the 
statutes183 dictated that necessity was not a substantive part of the UK law adopted by 
New Zealand.184 It found that “necessity was and remains an essential underpinning and 
test for parliamentary privilege in the United Kingdom.”  Hence, the adoption of the 
common law and practices of the House of Commons in New Zealand by statute, does 
not mean that the statute requires some different approach.185   
2  The two approaches to necessity 
There are two concepts of necessity that can be identified from these cases.  The first is the Keilly 
necessity which derives from the case of Keilly v Carson186. The second is an underpinning 
necessity, derived from the “necessity” test in R v Chaytor187, the Canadian case of Vaid188 and 
Stockdale v Hansard189. The necessity test based on these cases is the underpinning test for the 
scope of parliamentary privilege. Its nature defied the suggestions that necessity test was not part 
of the common law that governs parliamentary privilege that was arrogated by New Zealand 
through Parliamentary Privileges Act 1865.190  For the sake of brevity, the two concepts are 
referred to in shortened forms, the “Keilly necessity” and the “Leigh underpinning necessity” 
respectively.   
(a)  Keilly necessity 
McGee contends that this is the only necessity recognised by law for the purpose of parliamentary 
privilege; yet, even if it were to be adopted, it would play only a subordinate role of elucidating 
art 9, but it should not treated as the basis of parliamentary privilege.191 As has been seen in the 
discussion of the Keilly case above, Keilly necessity allows for the privileges, powers and 
immunities to be adapted to the needs and purposes of the functions of parliament. It is not the 
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basis of the parliamentary privilege and should not be used as a test to determine whether 
parliament can or cannot function without a particular occasion.192 
(b)  Leigh underpinning necessity 
The second is what Leigh identified as the concept of “underpinning necessity” based on the UK 
case of Stockdale v Hansard 193and Chaytor and Vaid. The concept of the underpinning necessity 
can be identified in Patteson J’s ruling in Stockdale v Hansard:194  
All persons ought to be very tender in preserving to the House all privileges which 
may be necessary for their exercise, and to place the most implicit confidence in their 
representatives as to the due exercise of those privileges. But power and especially 
power of invading the rights of others, is a very different thing:  it is to be regarded, 
not with tenderness, but with jealousy; and unless the legality of it be most clearly 
established, those who act under it must be answerable for the consequences. 
[emphasis added].  
The “underpinning necessity” in Stockdale195 seems to require two things. The first is that 
everyone including the courts must with tenderness preserve to the House all privileges that may 
be necessary to its business.  The second suggests a human rights element, which requires a more 
solemn obligation to the extent that an individual’s right must be “regarded with jealousy”.   
The second obligation amplifies the court’s role in the contemporary legal context196 when 
tasked with identifying the scope of parliamentary privilege. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act 
provides:197  
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights 
and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to 
any other meaning. 
The art 9 of the Bill of Right 1688 fell to be interpreted by the court when determining the 
scope of parliamentary privilege. In undertaking this task, the court has an obligation to take 
account of the rights of individuals under the Bill of Rights 1990 specifically, the right not to 
have their reputations harmed and the right to have access to remedies for such harm.   
However, the Court in Leigh is being criticised for failing to base its decision on art 9 
which would have required it to use the accepted interpretation techniques198 to interpret art 9. It 
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is argued that such criticism is without basis because s 6 is not concerned with a particular 
interpretation approach, apart from the requirement that such interpretation must be consistent 
with the rights and freedoms contained in the BORA.199  The use by the Supreme Court of the 
underlying necessity test to interpret the scope of parliamentary privilege was open to it in 
observing its obligation under s 6 of BORA.200 At this juncture, where the constitutional role of 
the court comes into opposition with parliamentary exclusive cognizance, ie the right not to 
interfere with parliamentary privilege, one has to give way to the other. The situation is not 
helped by the non-entrenching character of the Bill of Rights, which does not allow it to abrogate 
inconsistent laws. Tucker explains the situation as follows: 201  
The basic constitutional roles of the court, those of applying and interpreting 
legislation, would oblige the court to insist upon the general application of the 
law which therefore risks causing the judiciary or the executive to interfere with 
the proper operation of Parliament. 
The situation reflects the stark reality “that the rights of an individual cannot be more 
important than the preservation of New Zealand’s system of representative parliamentary 
democracy”202, even to the extent that no “judicial remedy is available for those outside who are 
adversely affected by statements made or things done in the proceedings of Parliament even in 
relation to their rights protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act”.203 Prebble204 points out 
that in the interplay between these interests, the legislature’s role of representing public interest is 
overriding.  
D  Qualified Privilege 
The significance of art 9 is that, whilst participating in the proceedings in parliament, members of 
parliament are not liable for communicating material which would otherwise be defamatory. Such 
communications are absolutely privileged for the purposes of defamation actions.205 
Statements that are not absolutely protected can be qualified. This means that a defence of 
qualified privilege can be invoked by a person who has a moral or legal duty to report or 
communicate a matter that would otherwise be defamatory, to a receiver who also has a legal duty 
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or right to receive such statement.206 The reporter would lose the protection if his or her act was 
actuated by ill will or he or she took improper advantage of the occasion; that is, he or she 
knowingly used the privileged occasion to defame.207 A defence of qualified privilege is 
effectively the same as a defence of absolute privilege so long as this not rebutted.  This rule 
places a doubly heavy burden on the harmed person who, in order to be successful in a 
defamation suit, must not only prove that the comments had been defamatory, but that they had 
been actuated by ill will or the privileged occasion had been improperly taken advantage of. 
However, it is not entirely clear which parliamentary communications attract privilege and 
which do not. Certain statements that would normally be seen as absolutely privileged because 
they occur within parliamentary precincts or between key participants in the parliamentary 
process – such as between members, parliamentary staff and constituents – may not be.  
 Communications between members and their constituents enjoy qualified privilege only. 
In a defamation suit, Rivlin v Bilainkin,208the court in England did not accept that absolute 
privilege applied to covered letters from constituents that were delivered to members’ individual 
mail boxes in the parliament precinct. Additionally, in the case of Mr Strauss,209 a member of 
parliament who sent an allegedly defamatory letter of complaint to a Minister on a matter he 
might later have wished to raise in the House was held to be covered by qualified privilege. This 
decision seems to settle that communications between members of parliament are not absolutely 
privileged. In contrast, a letter of complaint sent to the Speaker by a member, about the conduct 
of another member, was absolutely privileged in Rost v Edwards.210 The situation has not been 
clear in New Zealand either.  In Hyams v Peterson,211 the question of privilege could arise in 
proceedings where no member of parliament was involved in the alleged communication.  In 
Cushing v Peters,212 statements in the House were initially admitted as evidence to prove 
historical events, but this was overturned on appeal. 
Meetings of party caucus are not protected by absolute privilege as they are not 
proceedings in Parliament.213 McGee is adamant that parliamentary documentations – such as 
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those lodged by ministers in the form of draft questions, petitions, notices of motions and Bills 
and amendments – are absolutely privileged despite being processed outside the floor of the 
House.214  This assertion however is doubted according to Leigh, where the courts would only 
allow absolute privilege for communications processed outside the privileged parliamentary 
proceedings if the claimant of absolute privilege would satisfy the courts that the communication 
was necessary for the core function of the House where the claim would have resulted in 
depriving individuals of their basic rights.        
E Behaviour of public servants 
The professional conduct of public officials is regulated by the States Services Commission215.  In 
his submission to the Privileges Committee, the Commissioner of States Services acknowledged 
that the decision in Leigh did not pose any “management difficulties for the Public Service, as it 
is consistent with obligations that apply generally to public servants”.216 The Commissioner’s 
submission reflects the underlying public service culture of ethical responsibility not to 
communicate untruths and maligning advice to Ministers. The submission also implies that civil 
servants who do not act ethically or responsibly would be subject to the Service’s disciplinary 
mechanisms which act as a deterrent to such behaviour. There is nothing in the Commissioner’s 
submission to suggest that public servants’ communications with their Ministers would be better 
protected by absolute privilege.  The Commissioner’s submission indicates that qualified 
privilege is the appropriate protection for public service communications, whether with the 
Minister or otherwise.  
From the Service’s point of view, the definition of “proceedings in parliament” in the new 
Act217  might have an adverse implication not only for the civil service institution but for 
parliament as well.  Under the new definition of “proceedings in parliament”, any communication 
that is made “in the preparation of a document for the purpose of or incidental to the transacting 
of the business”218 of the House is absolutely privileged. The obvious risk there is the wider 
opportunity for an errant civil servant to take improper advantage under the pretext of 
“preparation of a document for the purpose of or incidental to the transacting of the business of 
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the House”219 to communicate with impunity untruths to their Ministers or any other 
parliamentarian in the pretext of conducting their official duties. Additionally, the Services 
Commission would be barred from investigating the officer for misconduct because according to 
the definition, the officer’s adverse statement would be protected by immunity. For the Services 
to investigate the officer would amount to impinging on parliamentary privilege220  The House, 
on the other hand, has nothing to gain from relying on besmeared statements in conducting its 
business.221 
The case of De Maria222 clarifies this situation.  De Maria was a member of the state of 
Queensland’s university academic staff.  He supplied documents to a senator who tabled them in 
the Senate committee without first reading their contents. Some of the documents contained 
adverse comments by De Maria against his university colleagues, who then launched a 
misconduct investigation of De Maria.  
The issue was whether the adverse documents supplied by De Maria, part of the 
“proceedings in parliament” and if so, the disciplinary proceedings against De Maria on the basis 
of those documents (that were now before the senate and protected by absolute privilege) which 
the University Disciplinary Committee was conducting at the time, would constitute contempt of 
the Senate. 
It should be noted that the controversial scope of parliamentary privilege in De Maria arose 
from the definition of “proceedings in Parliament” in the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) 
s 16(2), which is verbatim of New Zealand’s definition of “proceedings in Parliament” in s 10(1) 
and s 10(2) in  New Zealand’s Parliamentary Privilege Act, 2014.      
Because the Act replaces the law in Leigh,223 the potential for outsiders to “manufacture 
Parliamentary privilege for a document by the artifice of planting the document upon a 
Parliamentarian”224, can only be imagined. 
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One of the reasons given for extending absolute privilege to officers such as Gow was to 
avoid the risk of a “chilling effect”. It is claimed that under a protection of qualified privilege, the 
officer is always faced with a “looming risk of possibility of prosecution or legal action”.225 
Consequently, the officer would be so risk averse as to prevent him or her from fully 
communicating to the Minister what the latter needs for his or her parliamentary functions.226 
Absolute privilege would rid the officer of the threat.  
This claim of the likelihood for the officers to be risk averse because of fear of not being 
protected by absolute privilege is doubted.  As the Commissioner of State Services suggested, the 
Service’s communications had been operating satisfactorily on the underlying qualified privilege 
protection and the Leigh decision was in line with the Service’s policy.227  The decision in Leigh 
did not pose any “management difficulties for the Public Service, as it is consistent with 
obligations that apply generally to public servants”.228 
 
V THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE – PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 
ACT 2014 
A   Introduction 
 The conclusion reached by Parliament,229 was that Leigh represented a significant shift in the 
interpretation of the scope of privilege “mov[ing] New Zealand away from the position of other 
Commonwealth countries”.230 It is submitted that this affirmation cannot be correct because the 
law of necessity in the “underlying necessity” sense now exists as a test in Canada as established 
in the Vaid231 case as well as in the United Kingdom in Chaytor232.   
The explanatory notes to the Parliamentary Privilege Bill 2013233 when the Bill was first 
introduced stated the Bill’s three main purposes.234  First, it was to clarify “for the avoidance of 
doubt” aspects of the scope of parliamentary privilege by overriding the decision in Leigh; second 
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it was to override the principle of “effective repetition” in the decision in Jennings v Buchanan,235 
and third, it was to modernise related pieces of legislation.   
This was not the first time in the recent past that legislation has been recommended for 
clarification of the scope of parliamentary privilege as a result of the outcome of a defamation 
action. In July 1998, the Privileges Select Committee concerned with the decision in Buchanan v 
Jennings 236 recommended amending the Legislature Act237 to override it.  In the Jennings 
decision, a person was liable for “effective repetition” when “affirming or endorsing words 
written or spoken in [parliamentary] proceedings where the statement would not, but for the 
proceedings in parliament, give rise to criminal or civil liability”.238 The main concern was the 
“effective repetition” rule exposed parliamentary statements directly for scrutiny by the courts 
which could lead to a break down in comity.239 The 1998 referral for legislation did not 
materialise due to stalled developments.240 It was not until the 2012 inquiry into the Leigh 
decision that these matters were reviewed and recommended to be all addressed in the 2014 
Act.241  
 This part of the discussion focuses on the relevant provisions of the Parliamentary 
Privilege Act 2014 and their implications on the scope of parliamentary privilege.242  
B   Codification – A Choice within Parliament’s Exclusive Cognizance 
It is trite law that the courts determine the scope of privilege.243 Once identified, the 
administration of a privilege is a subjective exercise in which parliament in its exclusive 
cognizance solely decides how best such privilege should be used.244   
In building the case for legislating, Joseph,245 in his submission to the Privileges 
Committee, makes an alarming revelation regarding the Leigh decision:  
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The damage that Leigh inflicts on Parliament is incalculable… . It can no longer 
be assumed, for example that members of the public when giving evidence or 
submissions before select committees, will be covered by parliamentary 
privilege.  If Leigh is our exemplar, the Supreme Court would say that it suffices 
in defamation actions that persons who appear before select committees have the 
defence of qualified privilege. 
This paper contends that there is no basis for such alarm. The Court in Leigh makes it clear 
that absolute privilege protects the core functions of parliament—those that are transacted on the 
floor of the House and its committees.246  The “necessity” test in Leigh applies to communications 
that are processed outside absolutely privileged spheres ie, Parliament and its committees.  
1   Codified definition of “Proceedings in Parliament” 
Section 10(1) and 10(2) of the Act247 defines “proceedings in Parliament”:248  
(1) Proceedings in Parliament, for the purposes of Art 9 of the Bill of Rights 
1688, … means all words spoken and acts done in the course of, or for 
purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of the House or a 
committee.  
(2) The definition in subsection (1) must be taken to include the following:  
… 
(b) the preparation of a document for purposes of or incidental to the 
transacting of any business of the House or a committee. 
… 
The explanatory notes to the Parliamentary Privilege Bill 2013 state that s10 of the Act 
clarifies proceedings in parliament for the purpose of art 9, but is not an exhaustive definition of 
the term.249 Adoption of the definition of the meaning of “proceedings in parliament” from the 
Australian Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) was recommended.250 Consequently, section 10(1) and (2) 
are verbatim of s16(2) of the Commonwealth of Australia Act. The rest of s10 and other 
provisions bear close similarities to the Australian provisions.   
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2  The United Kingdom position 
The United Kingdom Parliament has expressed its reluctance to define “proceedings in 
parliament”.  Lord Sewell’s251 submission to the Committee252 voices the recommendations of the 
UK Joint Committee Report253. The UK Joint Committee did not believe “at this stage that the 
problem…is sufficient to justify legislation”.254 However, the option is open if Parliament should 
consider it necessary.  He also referred to the UK Government’s response to the Joint Committee 
in which it observed that the issue of privilege covering communications between officers and 
their ministers was a matter for the courts”.255 On the same footing, the Joint Report256 
acknowledges that the UK courts have satisfactorily dealt with the contentious issues involving 
parliamentary privilege in the Chaytor case and the UK Parliament did not consider it  necessary 
to define the meaning of “proceedings in parliament”.257   
The UK 2014 Joint Report258 recommendations, however, differ from its earlier 
recommendations in the 1999 Joint Report259 where it recommended defining “proceedings in 
parliament” but with certain alterations to the definition in s 16(2) of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Act.260 The 1999 Committee no doubt realised the adverse implications of extending 
privilege outside of the core functions of the House. It recommended instead that any definition 
of “proceedings in parliament” under art 9, should not be extended to include statements between 
members and ministers, and recommended a proviso that the preparatory drafts and notes similar 
to s 16(2),261 “do not circulate more widely than is reasonable for the member to obtain assistance 
and advice”.262  
Importantly, the 1999 Joint Committee263 did not think it was reasonable to distinguish 
between statements between members themselves, between members with a local authority or 
public official, or between members with their constituents264. That Report recommended that the 
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protection in art 9 “should remain confined to the core activities of Parliament, unless a pressing 
need is shown for an extension”.265  In 1999, the House of Commons did not approve the 
recommendations for an enactment and still retains that position after the 2014 Joint Report.   
C   The Australian experience  
It is important to examine some of the experiences of the Australian courts and parliaments in 
relation to the definition of “proceedings in parliament” in their respective statute laws, for 
lessons to be learned about the possible implications of the definition, on  the scope of 
parliamentary privilege in New Zealand under the 2014 Act.  
1  O’Chee v Rowley266   
The distinguished scholar, Enid Campbell was concerned that at in formulating the definition of 
“proceedings in parliament” the Australian Parliament gave insufficient consideration to how 
privilege might be affected “in an occasion where documents are sent to members of parliament 
by members of public, in the expectation that the documents would be used by the member in the 
transaction of parliamentary business”267.   
This perceived mischief in s 16(2) of the Parliamentary Privileges Act (Cth)268 (which is 
verbatim of s 10(1) and s 10(2) of the Parliamentary Privilege Act, 2014),269 came to light in the 
case of O’Chee v Rowley.270 Senator O’Chee made defamatory comments against Mr Rowley in a 
radio interview.  Rowley then sought a discovery order of the constituency files that were in the 
possession of the senator on which the latter based his allegations against Rowley.  The senator 
refused to hand over the documents.     
The court held that a document or communication was protected by absolute privilege 
under the “incidentality test’ in s 16(2) if it was shown that the member retained it in his or her 
possession with a view to using it in his or her parliamentary role, as it would constitute an act 
done “for the purposes of or incidental to” the transacting of the business of the House.271 
Additionally the court held, that s 16(2) allows for the absolute privilege to continue to apply to 
the any documents that are prepared for the purpose of transacting the business of the House and  
  
265 UK Joint Report 1999 above n 81 at [110]. 
266 O’Chee v Rowley (1997) 150 ALR 1999;  ANZACATT Briefing Paper No.2 6 December, 2012. 
www.aph.gov.au/~/media/.../Parliamentary-Briefing-No-2.pdf 
267 Campbell above n 44  at 45. 
268 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth). 
269 Parliamentary Privilege Act, 2014. 
270 O’Chee above n 249. 
271 Campbell above n 44.   
36 
 
after the transaction has been completed in case they may be raised again in parliament”272. The 
court, however, noted that there should come a time when such materials would cease being 
retained for the purposes of s 16(2). 
The O’Chee273 decision may have implications how the Parliament might deal with 
communications from constituents or any member of the public in an occasion of “incidentality” 
under the new definition in s 10(1).    
Parliament, though, has acknowledged that although legislation can provide clarity, “it does 
not remove all ambiguity….either way the courts have a role to determine the boundaries of 
parliamentary privilege”.274 
2  De Maria 275– parliamentary case 
As has been seen earlier in De Maria, once documents are supplied to the senator, they become 
part of the “proceedings in parliament” within the meaning of s 16(2) of the Act.276  The Senate 
committee, found that the “university had taken disciplinary action against De Maria “as a direct 
consequence of his communication with the Senate …and the senator’s tabling of such material in 
the Senate conferred absolute privilege on that material…the university in taking action against 
De Maria…committed a contempt of the senate”.277 The disciplinary proceedings against De 
Maria subsequently dissolved because of the threat of contempt. 
The senate committee, though, had misgivings that the senate should be put through much 
trouble that arose from “the tabling of public records under privilege…documents on behalf of or 
authored by other persons”.278  
4  Risk of Misuse of Privilege 
The O’Chee and De Maria cases suggest that the definition in s 10(1) of the Parliamentary 
Privilege Act, 2014 is sufficiently wide to afford absolute privilege to communications that are 
otherwise not normally protected by parliamentary privilege. For example, communications 
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between constituents and their representatives are currently protected by qualified privilege.279 
This might no longer be the case under the new Parliamentary Privilege Act, 2014. 
Additionally, there is a perception of “inappropriateness” for parliament to have to deal 
with communications that are not per se in their core functions as seen in De Maria. This 
indicates that there would be unnecessary additional administrative burden to parliament in such 
situations.  
The wide scope of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” could possibly be used as a 
license to harm individuals.280   In the case of Grassby281 the New South Wales Supreme Court 
held that a letter containing defamatory comments that was sent to a member, and was intended to 
be used by the member in committee proceedings, was not protected by art 9 of the Bill of Rights 
but was merely protected by qualified privilege. Allen J was not to be swayed by the defendant’s 
arguments “that members would be deterred from making use of information supplied to them by 
constituents because of a possibility of a ‘chilling effect’” if their informants are to be sued for 
supplying such information. New South Wales is the only Australian state that does not have in 
place a codified definition of “proceedings in parliament”.  
Apart from the case of an errant constituent who might seek absolute privilege for their 
adverse documents by planting them in the possession of their representatives, members 
themselves might choose to hand over to the court any communication which they would 
otherwise be obliged to protect.  For example, a member in receipt of a letter of complaint from a 
constituent he or she does not particularly like could hand it over to the police or the courts to be 
used against the constituent on the pretext that it was not “incidental’ to the member’s work in 
Parliament.   
 In light of the above  problems relating to the application of the definition of “proceedings 
in Parliament”, the test the Supreme Court in Leigh described the necessity test as having a 
“sharper focus and involves significantly less uncertainty than closeness of connection”.282  
However, it remains to be seen how the New Zealand courts and parliament would decide any 
situations similar to those in the Australian jurisdictions, should they arise under the 
Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014. 
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VI       RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
The Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 has just come into effect and the courts have not yet the 
opportunity to review its provisions. Although the substantive provisions similar to the Australian 
Act,283 have been tested in the Australian courts, it cannot be said with certainty that the New 
Zealand courts would adopt the approaches taken by their Australian counterparts. Their rulings 
are not binding in New Zealand—although the relevant legislative provisions are the same.    
This paper finds that the underlying contention relating to the decision in Leigh and 
Parliament’s response by enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014, is an issue of comity; the 
mutual restraint and respect that parliaments and the courts have for each other to be able to 
operate effectively for the interest of their citizens.  Far from limiting the options of harmed 
individuals to seek remedies in the courts, these recommendations are made on a comity “best 
practice” approach. It seems that the most appropriate measures would be for the House to 
strengthen its control of its members. Thus the following proposals recommend changes to the 
House’s Standing Orders and the 2014 Act.   
It is agreed that the House’s Standing Orders already have in place in relation to the 
House’s select committees and their procedures,284 a number natural justice measures. However 
uttering slanderous or adverse comments on the floor of the House cannot be avoided and are not 
subject to contempt.285 This is consistent with the member’s constitutional “freedom of speech” 
enshrined art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688.  The debates in the House are subject to the Speakers 
control, who is at liberty to order the maker of the statement to apologise or make such other 
amends.  Contempt is invoked only for disobeying the Speaker’s Orders.  Apparently the Speaker 
cannot stop the member before they make any adverse comments in the House.  To do so might 
require the member to advise the Speaker before the debates, about what he or she would be 
saying .  To adopt such a procedure would infringe the member’s freedom of speech.    
It is suggested that on the ground of the instantaneous and irreparable damage caused by 
comments made during debates on the floor of the House,286 a member who disobeys an Order by 
the Speaker to remedy the damage that their comments might have caused, must be subject to a 
more stringent contempt punishment than for those that occur in the Select Committees.  
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This more stringent contempt discipline is justified on the grounds that the existing 
comprehensive natural justice procedures for the Select Committees alleviate the harm caused to 
individuals during the committee’s proceedings. No such prevention is available for the debates 
on the floor of the House. Again, it is the constitutional rights of members not to have such 
preventative measures imposed on them when they speak on the floor of the House.  The 
contempt is invoked only when the member fails to obey the Speaker’s Order in relation to the 
comment for eg, to retract such comment.  
The first step is to have a new Standing Order inserted to expressly create a new species of 
contempt for disobeying an Order of the Speaker that arises from a defamatory or adverse 
statement on the floor of the House that targets a named person or is made in a way to readily 
identify a person.   
The second recommendation is to impose a higher fine threshold for contempt that arises 
from the new species of contempt set out above.  Section 22(1) of the Act sets the fine for 
contempt of Parliament at no more than $1,000. It is recommended that the fine for the 
recommended new species of contempt be significantly higher.287   
Far from limiting the options to resort to the courts for remedy, these  comity best practice 
recommendations are aimed to settle matters within Parliament’s internal practices, to reduce the 
need for the courts to have to intervene.   
VII   CONCLUSION 
The decision in Leigh and the response from Parliament in enacting the Parliamentary Privileges 
Act 2014 touch on the value of comity; the mutual restraint and respect that the legislature and the 
judiciary have for each other to be able to impart those constitutional rights for which citizens 
look to them to protect on their behalf.   
 Parliament had the opportunity in Leigh to balance political needs and respect for 
individual rights rather than to treat its lawmaking power as an opportunity to make a statement 
of supremacy.  A more restrained approach would involve d a closer assessment of the competing 
values of protecting the citizen’s basic rights and the public interest that is vested in the member’s 
freedom of speech.  This would involve a closer examination and comparison of the efficacy of 
the “necessity test” in Leigh and the experiences of the Australian jurisdictions which should 
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inform the lawmakers of the implication of codifying “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of 
its privilege.  More importantly, it would involve taking account of the human rights obligations 
that New Zealand has under its BORA as well as its international human rights commitments.  
Such considerations if taken on board would have placed less strain on comity as Parliament 
would have been informed that the court’s obligations under t s 6 of the BORA288might result in 
the Act being interpreted in ways the lawmakers might not have intended. 
 To maintain comity, a number of “best practice” amendments are recommended to be 
inserted in the Standing Orders and the 2014 Act to ensure that matters are appropriately and 
timely resolved before a situation reaches a stage that will require the intervention of the courts.     
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